DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND STATE LEGISLATURES[1]

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"The people reign in the American political world as the Deity does in the universe. They are the cause and the aim of all things." The words are Alexis De Tocqueville's, writing in 1835 in *Democracy in America*, but they have a contemporary ring to them, especially to those of you who have witnessed first-hand the reemergence of direct democracy in the states. Let me offer some figures on this. From 1950-1974, the American states adopted 279 initiatives, but in the succeeding 25 years, they adopted 929. If my math is correct, that's an increase of 233% in a quarter century. No previous era has seen such frequent resort to direct popular rule.

Of course, numbers themselves are not dispositive. If there were large numbers of inconsequential initiatives clogging the ballot, I wouldn't be here today discussing direct democracy. But the increase in numbers is matched by an increase in the importance of the issues proposed for public consideration.

The resurgence of direct democracy that began in the late 20th century has continued into the new millennium and has been enlivened by the first use of the recall to unseat a governor since 1921, when North Dakota did so. Clearly, something has happened. There is a new impatience with public officials and a new willingness to circumvent established institutions of government when they are perceived as unresponsive. If the people rule like a God, it is like an angry God, who is none too pleased with state legislators, or with other state officials for that matter.

All of this, of course, has implications for state legislatures. When I was asked to speak to you about these effects, it seemed like a simple task. All I would need to do was highlight instances in which initiatives overturned policies devised by state legislatures, or circumscribed the policy choices available to them, or targeted state legislatures in general or their members in particular. Many of the examples that I might have used would, I suspect, have been familiar to you as well. They could have included California's tax-slashing Proposition 13 in 1978, Colorado's Taxpayer Bill of Rights in 1992, the introduction of term limits in Oklahoma and California, and California's Proposition 209 in 1996, which banned preference on the basis of race, gender, and other factors in public employment, public education, and public contracting. (Funny how California keeps reappearing on the list, isn't it?)

But if that was my first thought, my second thought was: boy, that sounds familiar. I think I have heard that talk on more than one occasion, and so I suspect that you have as well. And I doubt you want to hear it again. So, while I will certainly talk about the various ballot propositions that I have identified, I think it is worthwhile to explore the initiative and its effects in a broader context.

Several things, it seems to me, are striking about the examples that I did mention

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(aside from the fact that California seems to be implicated in almost all of them). First, the examples are all relatively recent, products of the last few decades. Although the initiative dates from the early twentieth century and nineteen of the states that have the initiative had adopted by 1918, I would wager that most of us would be hard pressed to add to my list a similarly famous initiative from an earlier era. The problem is not that we are poor students of history--or at least that's not the only problem. Nor is the problem that there simply were far fewer initiatives in the past, though that is certainly also true. Rather, the problem is that there simply do not appear to be any initiatives of similar national consequence in earlier decades.

A second observation about the initiatives I mentioned: They don't tend to be isolated occurrences, in the sense that they appear in, and have consequences for, only a single state. Rather, all of the initiatives I have highlighted have had ramifications beyond the borders of the states in which they were adopted. Thus, Proposition 13 spawned Proposition 2 1/2 in Massachusetts, as well as mini tax revolts in several other states. Colorado's Taxpayer Bill of Rights, which can itself be seen as the child of Proposition 13, has encouraged constitutional limits on taxing and spending in Arizona, Nevada, and Oklahoma, among other states. Term limits, of course, is the paramount example of an innovation that, once pioneered in 1990, swept through other initiative states. Within five years twenty other states had followed Oklahoma's lead in imposing tenure limits on state legislators. California's 1996 anti-affirmative-action proposition too has had national consequences; in fact, this Fall Michigan voters will consider an initiative expressly modeled on California's, with Ward Connerly, a leader in the California campaign to end racial preferences, playing a salient role in the Michigan effort as well. In fact, one could easily add to the list a variety of other policy areas in which the initiative has been widely used, such as abortion regulation, campaign finance, medical marijuana, and public education.

I believe that this widespread use of the initiative as the vehicle for nationwide policy movements is something new. My reading of history is that initiatives in the past dealt largely with state-specific problems; they didn't produce progeny in neighboring states. But, as I said, something has changed.

A final preliminary observation about recent salient initiatives: Although some of these initiatives were substantive, in the sense that they were designed to achieve particular policy objectives, many were not. They dealt with the structure and operation of state government rather than with the policies it produces. Term limits certainly fit into this category. So too did Illinois's proposal to reduce the size of the state legislature and California's Proposition 140, which prohibited legislators from earning state retirement benefits and required personnel reductions in legislative agencies and staff. Limitations on taxing and spending are likewise structural in character. Instead of identifying policy priorities, they simply seek to shrink government. Initiatives regulating campaign finance, which have proliferated in recent years, also deal with the how, not the what, of politics and government. This institutional focus is not altogether new. There have been instances in the past in which the initiative was used to structure state government or to regulate the selection and tenure of public officials. A perfect example is Missouri's 1940 initiative that established merit selection of judges. Nonetheless, the current emphasis on structural matters, if not unique, is at least distinctive.

Why have citizens in recent years turned to the initiative, to direct democracy? In

large part, the explanation is dissatisfaction with the performance of government and of those in government. This is reflected in a 2003 NCSL poll, which asked respondents to choose between two alternatives: “Making laws is a job best left to elected representatives” or “The public should decide issues directly by voting on them.” Only 30 percent of those polled chose to leave law-making to elected representatives, while 47% opted for a public vote on measures as well as candidates.

Also feeding voter frustration is the belief that those in office simply fail to listen. To too many citizens, state government--and governments in general--seem overly powerful and excessively expensive, isolated from popular concerns and insulated from popular control. For example, the same 2003 NCSL poll found that 1/3 of respondents believed that elected public officials were indifferent to what people like themselves thought, while only slightly more than 1/3 felt that officials did care about what their constituents thought. Some commentators trace the new constitutional populism to California's adoption of Proposition 13 in 1978. But Proposition 13 only demonstrated the potential of the constitutional initiative; it was more a symptom than a cause. As one leader of the California tax revolt put it at the time, "Our fight is not mainly about money. It's about control. They have to learn once and for all that it's our government."

Accompanying this disaffection is often a disdain for those who serve in public office, including legislators, perhaps particularly legislators. Such sentiments are, of course, nothing new. A little more than a century ago, Mark Twain famously described Congress as "the only true criminal class in America." Thank goodness he didn't take the opportunity to comment on state legislatures. But others did. Looking at the restrictions imposed on state legislatures by state constitutions, one late 19th-century observer concluded that they seemed premised on the "belief that legislatures are by nature utterly careless of the public welfare, if not hopelessly corrupt." One delegate to the California constitutional convention of 1879 drew the obvious conclusion. He proposed "that there shall be no legislature convened from and after the adoption of this Constitution . . . and any person who shall be guilty of suggesting that a Legislature be held, shall be punished as felon without benefit of clergy."

Throughout American history, distrust of government in general and legislatures in particular has served as an impetus for constitutional reform. But in the past, such concerns generally did not lead to efforts to institute or invigorate direct democracy. Most likely, this was because there always seemed to be other options available for ensuring honest and responsive government. The people may have wanted to be that all-powerful deity Tocqueville described. But they believed that reforms within the framework of representative government were all that they needed to accomplish this.

Initially, the solution was sought in annual elections of legislators, in order to cement the tie between legislators and constituents. As the familiar saying went, "where annual elections end, tyranny begins." When that failed, the hope was that electing judges and executive-branch officials, as well as legislators, would do the trick. If all branches represented the public, and one branch ignored public wishes, the other branches, would remain faithful and check the misconduct. When that alternative failed, the next idea was to enshrine public policy in the state constitution, safe from the depredations of self-interested officials. A delegate to the South Dakota constitutional convention of 1889 explained why: "The object of constitutions is to limit the legislature." The assumption apparently was that, unlike legislators, the delegates to a

constitutional convention would authentically reflect popular sentiments. A delegate to the Illinois constitutional convention of 1847 put it this way: those drafting the constitution "are what the people of the State would be, if they were congregated here in one mass meeting." But constitutional conventions proved a rather blunt and unsuccessful instrument for dealing with the democratic deficit.

Prior constitutional reformers also sought to make government more responsive to the people by expanding the electorate, by shifting the intrastate distribution of political power, and by restructuring government. The reforms were certainly undertaken: the full extension of the franchise via federal constitutional amendments and the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court's one person/one vote rulings, and the modernization of state legislatures and other institutions of state government. But somehow making government more representative and more transparent did not necessarily make it more responsive. Nor did it convince citizens that they were in charge of what went on in their state capitals.

This litany of dashed hopes has contributed to the current embrace of direct democracy. Only when the people dispense with representatives and act directly, proponents assert, can they hope to tame the entrenched political forces of the state. At a minimum, if they cannot ensure a responsive state legislature, they can at least curtail its freedom of action by constitutionalizing policy choices and by limiting the funds it can raise and spend—in sum, damage control.

The popular dissatisfaction I have described is an important part of the picture, but it is only a part. Powerful groups and individuals have also contributed to the resurgence of direct democracy. Indeed, some critics of direct democracy dismiss the current period as a "faux populist moment." One need merely scan the titles of recent books on direct democracy to get the flavor of the critique. These volumes demonize direct democracy as "democratic delusions." “democracy disrailed,” "dangerous democracy," and even “paradise lost” (though this version differs somewhat from John Milton's), And of course the National Conference of State Legislatures has itself been highly critical of direct democracy. In a 2002 report, it concluded that states without the initiative process should not even consider adopting it and that states with the initiative process should make it harder to utilize.

Many of these critics charge that wealthy groups and influential individuals have hijacked the initiative process, using it to manipulate a gullible public in order to advance their ideological or economic interests. Certainly, there is some anecdotal evidence to support this. Two quick examples: In California in 1998. an initiative was adopted dismantling the state's system of bilingual education and replacing it with an English immersion program. The initiative was the brainchild of a Silicon Valley entrepreneur, Ron Unz, who subsidized almost all the costs of the campaign with more than $750,000 of his own money. Unz has since taken his campaign on the road, following up with successes in Arizona and Massachusetts. A second example: In 1996 in Florida, a grassroots group—the Tax Cap Committee—sponsored a successful tax-limitation measure. However, state campaign disclosure records reveal that of the $4.7 million raised by the Committee, $3.5 million came from a single source, the state’s powerful sugar industry.

There is no doubt that the initiative process has become increasingly professionalized and increasingly expensive. These developments do not, in my

judgment, destroy the democratic credibility of the initiative process. But because they do affect state legislatures, let me highlight a couple important consequences.

One key change is the rise of policy entrepreneurs, who use the initiative process to advance ideological or personal goals. These policy entrepreneurs may include private citizens like Ron Unz. But they may also include public officials, who use initiatives as a vehicle for reelection or advancement. Let me pick on California again, by focusing on two examples: Arnold Schwarzenegger and Pete Wilson. Both Republican governors and both supporters of direct democracy--in an interview in *The Economist* in 2004, Governor Schwarzenegger said: "I love it when the people go to the polls and flex their muscles and let their voices be heard!" Both are also accustomed to using the initiative process as a political weapon. In 2005, unable to find common ground with the state legislature, Schwarzenegger decided to take his agenda to the voters directly, and the initiative process enabled him to do so. He sponsored 8 initiatives, dealing with subjects as various as parental notification for minors seeking abortions, tenure for public school teachers, prescription drugs, and redistricting. None of these initiatives was approved by the voters, a major--if temporary--political blow to the Governator. But in taking this tack, Schwarzenegger was merely following in the footsteps of Pete Wilson, who had successfully used the initiative both to promote his candidacies and to advance Republican Party interests. Thus, in 1990, when first running for governor, Wilson championed Proposition 115, a get-tough-on-crime measure; and in 1994, when running for reelection, he became the campaign point person for Proposition 184, a three-strikes measure for repeat offenders, and for Proposition 187, an anti-illegal-immigrants measure that was eventually struck down by the courts. Through these initiatives, Wilson activated the Republican base, and in both years he won the governorship.

This use of the initiative process by politicians is, I would emphasize, not limited to California. Nor is it limited to governors. State legislators too may invoke the process if they find themselves stymied in getting legislation passed. For example, in California the successful initiative outlawing gill-netting was drafted by Doris Allen, a legislator who for years had unsuccessfully sought to get such protection through the legislature. And in Oregon the state’s victims’ rights amendment was championed by Kevin Mannix, a representative who had found his efforts to enact legislation on the issue blocked by what he termed “special interests.” Thus, the initiative process may empower individual legislators even as it reduces the legislature's control over public policy.

Another recent change in the initiative process is the activation of national interest groups that contribute funding, expertise, and information to state-level initiative sponsors. Many of the examples that I have already mentioned, from term limits to TELs, illustrate this. But let me add a further point. Some national interest groups use the initiative process not only to enact legislation but also to weaken political opponents. The idea is to force their opponents to expend funds to counter initiative threats, thereby reducing the funds they have available to support candidates. Resource attrition is a particularly important tactic for groups. such as Americans for Tax Reform, that have a broad ideological agenda and more resources than their prospective opponents. This obviously has an effect on funding for the campaigns of those seeking, or seeking to retain, legislative seats

Thus far, I have proceeded from the perspective of those involved in the initiative process. But what does the resurgence in direct democracy look like from the perspective of the state legislator?

One area in which the effects of direct democracy are immediate and important is in legislative agenda setting. Typically, legislators have strong views on what issues are important, what will benefit the state or their constituents. Party leadership certainly plays a role in the formulation of those views, as does public opinion. So too may personal ambition: Legislators want to place on the agenda items that enable them to benefit their constituents, so as to enhance their approval ratings and their reelection prospects. One needn't believe that legislators are driven exclusively by political self-interest, to recognize that good policy is often good politics (and vice versa). But whatever legislators' motivations may be, the point is that they care deeply about what issues are on the political agenda.

They have equally strong feelings about what issues should not be on the legislative agenda. Some issues might not be ripe for resolution. Some issues might polarize the populace along racial or religious or class or other lines, so that raising them would be divisive and counter-productive. And some issues are so politically controversial that no legislators concerned about their political future would ever want to confront them. In my own state of New Jersey, for example, there is a saying that tax policy is the "third rail" of New Jersey politics--no legislator concerned for his or her political career wants to touch it. Other states doubtless have their own third rails. But all this points to a simple and unmistakable point: whether for public purposes or for political survival, legislators want to define and control what issues are on the legislative agenda.

Direct democracy alters all this. When groups raise an issue in a direct-democracy state, there is always the prospect--or, if you prefer, the threat--that unless the legislature satisfactorily addresses the issue, those groups may take the issue to the public directly. The credibility of the threat to go to the public will depend, of course, on the character of the issue and on the resources of the group or groups raising it. But what this suggests is that in direct democracy states, one finds not one but two legislative agendas, one for the state legislature and one for the populace in its legislative capacity.

Obviously, state legislators do not control the populace's legislative agenda. Even more important, this bifurcated legislative agenda means that legislators do not fully control even the agenda within the state legislature. Even though they might not wish to, legislators may find themselves obliged to address issues that they think are not ripe for resolution. Or that they think are divisive. Or that they think are dangerous politically. Because if they do not address these issues, and if they do not enact legislation to deal with them, they risk seeing the issues placed on the public's legislative agenda and risk seeing less desirable policies adopted via the initiative. Thus in 1980, after the Liberterian Party in Alaska got a measure to abolish the state personal income tax on the ballot, the Alaska Legislature enacted tax relief to satisfy those who might otherwise approve the initiative. Similarly, in 1998, after it appeared that another Silicon Valley entrepreneur, Reed Hastings, would qualify a ballot measure that would have substantially expanded the charter school system in California, the legislature preempted the measure by providing for annual increases in the number of

charter schools. Thus, the threat of the initiative gives citizens and groups leverage in the legislative process.

Indeed, the situation is, from the legislative point of view, even more dire. Legislators may not have the luxury of waiting for groups to raise an issue or exert pressure. For if they wait till groups form around an issue, those groups may decide to bypass the legislature entirely and proceed immediately to the direct democracy route. Thus, in order for legislators to head off what they view as undesirable public policy, they may need to anticipate potential movements and adopt legislation in order to preempt those movements. The policies enacted under this pressure will likely not be those that they would have chosen without the threat of direct democracy. Rather, the policies are the minimum that legislators think will satisfy the groups threatening an initiative or that will prevent the formation of groups that could place the issue on the ballot. Put differently, one might say that direct democracy encourages legislators to engage in "lesser evil" policymaking.

If groups do succeed in putting a policy issue on the ballot, then legislators may face a different problem. They may find themselves obliged to take a stand on the initiative. This is particularly likely during an election year, when one's opponent in a campaign can be expected to seize the opportunity to put the incumbent on the spot. Take, for example, the affirmative action initiative currently on the ballot in Michigan. If public opinion is sharply divided on the initiative, as I suspect it is, then one can expect political challengers to pressure incumbents to announce their position on the issue, in the hope that they will run alienate potential supporters who strongly favor or fervently oppose the proposal.

Even the adoption of an initiative does not bring an end to problems for state legislators, because many initiatives reduce the resources available to them to pursue their own policy priorities. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of tax or expenditure limits, under which the overall funds available to the legislature may be reduced, requiring legislators to cut or eliminate favored programs. Even when initiatives do not directly limit legislative spending choices, they may do so indirectly. Take, for example, two education initiatives adopted in Florida in 2002. Voters approved a measure that guaranteed "every four-year-old child in Florida" a "high-quality pre-kindergarten learning opportunity" and another that authorized "funding for sufficient classrooms so that there may be a maximum number of students in public school courses." Needless to say, implementing these voter choices is an expensive proposition. And to the extent funds are diverted to these purposes, they cannot be used to support policies that legislators might prefer to fund.

Let me offer a broader take on this: The most thorough empirical examination of the fiscal effects of initiatives is found in a book, *For the Many or the Few*, by Professor John Matsusaka of the University of Southern California. Comparing initiative and non-initiative states over the last three decades, Matsusaka found that states with the initiative spent less and taxed less than did states without the initiative. Interestingly, for an earlier period (1902-1942), he found the opposite: initiative states out-taxed and out-spent non-initiative states. These findings suggest that the initiative is not inherently anti-government or anti-spending, rather its fiscal consequences depend on the political situation. But there is no denying that it has an effect.

If the initiative process has undermined state legislators' monopoly over public

policy and reduced their control over the legislative agenda, it is not surprising that state legislators have not sat idly by watching this happen. Rather, they have sought to safeguard their powers and their prerogatives by combating the initiative. In states that do not have the initiative, state legislatures have refused to authorize it, despite strong support for direct democracy in opinion polls. In states that do have the initiative, legislators have sought to reduce the incidence of initiatives and to cabin their effects.

How can state legislators reduce the frequency of initiatives? A cynic might say: by being responsive to the public. But it is of course far more complicated than that. One way that legislators have attempted to reduce the frequency of initiatives is by making it harder to qualify initiatives for the ballot. State constitutions and state statutes define the rules by which initiatives qualify, regulating the process of collecting signatures on initiative petitions, fixing the number of signatures that must be collected, determining the required geographic distribution of petition signatures, and establishing deadlines and procedures for the submission of petitions. Obviously, the more burdensome the requirements, the harder to qualify proposals for the ballot. But there are constitutional limits on what state legislatures can do. To the extent that the pertinent standards and regulations are enshrined in the state constitution, state legislatures cannot impose more stringent requirements without a constitutional amendment. This may not be an insuperable barrier. For example, Utah in 1998 amended its constitution to require a two-thirds vote of the people to adopt any initiative involving wildlife. And Montana in 2000 adopted an amendment that changed the state's distribution requirement, mandating that signatures be gathered from 50% of the state's counties. Legislative efforts to make the process more difficult may also run afoul of the U.S. Constitution. For example, federal courts have struck down laws that prohibited the payment of petition circulators, that banned the payment of petition circulators on a "per signature" basis, and that required petition circulators to notify the public that they were being paid for their work. The legal status of other requirements, such as that petition circulators be state residents, remains unclear.

Once an initiative gets on the ballot and is approved by the public, how then might legislators limit its effects? One obvious means is by having courts strike down the initiative as unconstitutional, and so state legislators have been in the forefront of those mounting constitutional challenges to initiatives. In California, Colorado, and Oregon during the 1990s, 35 of the 60 constitutional initiatives that were adopted—58%--were challenged in the courts; and of those 35, 15—that's 43%-- were invalidated in whole or in part, on either procedural or substantive grounds. To put these numbers in some perspective, one might compare this to invalidations of state statutes. Laws enacted by state legislatures are rarely challenged, and those that are challenged are seldom struck down as unconstitutional.

State legislators—or others--may challenge ballot propositions on substantive grounds, claiming that they violate rights protected by the federal Constitution or the state constitution. Take, for example, California Proposition 198, which required the state to use a "blanket ballot" in primary elections, so that registered voters, regardless of their political affiliation, could vote in the primary for any candidate of any party. After voters endorsed the Proposition, it was immediately challenged in federal court, with political parties claiming that it violated their right of freedom of association under the First Amendment. Eventually the U.S. Supreme Court agreed, striking down the

blanket-primary initiative in *California Democratic Party v. Jones* (2000). Or consider California Proposition 209, which—as noted--sought to eliminate affirmative action. ratification by the voters, it was immediately challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its implementation was delayed during this litigation, although ultimately the measure was upheld as constitutional.

Even more promising than substantive challenges are challenges to initiatives on procedural grounds. Most state constitutions include detailed provisions describing the procedures to be followed in the initiative process and the range of issues on which initiatives can—or cannot—be conducted, and opponents have used these provisions to overturn initiatives. Among the most frequent bases on which initiatives are invalidated are requirements that initiatives be restricted to a single subject, that voters have a separate vote on distinct issues, and that constitutional initiatives amend rather than revise the state constitution. Within just the last decade, for example, the Washington Supreme Court struck down on single-subject grounds an initiative that established license tab fees at $30 per year for motor vehicles and mandated no new taxes without the approval of the people. The Oregon Supreme Court invalidated a criminal justice initiative on the grounds that it involved multiple changes to the state constitution that should have been considered separately by the people. And the Arkansas Supreme Court prohibited the Secretary of State from placing an initiative on the ballot because the language of the proposal was misleading.

Assuming that legal challenges fail, state legislatures can still limit the effect of initiatives. Where the implementation of an initiative requires expenditure of funds, the legislature may simply refuse to appropriate the funds. For example, after Massachusetts voters by initiative mandated a system of public financing for elections, the Massachusetts legislature refused to fund the program, and it has remained to all intents and purposes a dead letter. Even when no substantial funding is required, initiatives may require implementing legislation if they are to be effective. A state legislature can refuse to enact such legislation, delay its enactment, or enact implementing legislation that limits the initiative's effects. Sometimes, when the legislature curtails the effects of an initiative, it is clearly intentional, as in the Massachusetts case. In other cases, however, the motivation is less clear. For example, take Proposition 63, approved by California voters in 1986, which "made English the state's official language and required the legislature and officials to take necessary steps to preserve and strengthen it." Even if one wished to implement the Proposition, its vague mandate made it extremely difficult for legislators to know what to do--and in fact, not much was done. Or take Proposition 209, California's anti-affirmative-action initiative. After its adoption, could the University of California extend preferences to students from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds that, although not explicitly racial, were highly correlated with race? Oftentimes, the interpretive and funding decisions that affect a winning initiative's policy impact appear in implementing legislation. Legislatures can, and sometimes do, write implementing legislation that prevents initiatives from having substantial impact, or at least the level of impact sought by their sponsors. Politics does not end with the adoption of an initiative, and one would be naïve to assume that it does.

Let me conclude. In his Gettysburg Address, Abraham Lincoln spoke of "government of the people, by the people, and for the people." The current reliance on

the initiative is rooted in a perception, basic to the state constitutional tradition, that a representative system of government—even if of the people and by the people-- may not produce a government for the people. This stands in marked contrast to the understanding underlying the federal Constitution, that deliberation by experienced and knowledgeable representatives will, in the words of James Madison, "refine and enlarge the public views" and thereby promote "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." This divergence is rooted in contrasting views of the threats to republican government. For James Madison and the federal Founders, the key concern was majority tyranny. For the state constitutional tradition, the primary dangers facing republican government are minority faction--power wielded by the wealthy or well-connected few—and the faithlessness of those in office. This perception has encouraged in the states a distrust of government by elected representatives and has made direct democracy seem more attractive. Thus, the problems I have been discussing are endemic problems, not temporary ones, and they are unlikely to disappear.

Let me close with a prediction. Thirty years from now, the NCSL will again be meeting in Nashville, it will again be sponsoring programs addressing the crucial issues facing state legislatures, and the threat of direct democracy will again be on the program. Let us hope that we will all be there to attend the session.

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